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CHAPTER 18 
Choosing the Elite 
Recmitment, Assessment, and Selection 
in Law Enforcement Tactical Teams and 
Military Special Forces 
Ole Boe, Kristin K. Woolley, and John Durkin 
NYPD Emergency Service Unit 
In the early morning hours of July 31, 2007, Gazi Abu Mezer and Lafi 
Khalil, two PcUestinians who had entered the United States after exploit-
ing loopholes in the immigration system. were in the operational phase 
of a planned suicide bombing of the New York City "fransit system. Their 
weapons: simple pipe bombs with electrical detonating switches packed 
into knapsacks. Two things would stand in the way of their attempt at 
martyrdom-their Egyptian roommate and the New York City Fblice 
Department's Emergency Service Unit (ESU). 
Mossabah, the roommate, had been taken to the New York Fblice 
Department's 88th Precinct. When the ESU tour commandex:, a veteran 
lieutenant arrived at the precinct, he interviewed Mossabah, having him 
start at the beginning of his recollections, interrupting him for clarifications 
and details. After digesting what he had heard, the commander began 
apprising his leadership of the situation and stressing that he believed 
Mossabah. He then looked at the roster of ESU officers working his shift, 
from midnight to 8 a.m. The urgency of the situation prohibited him from 
calling in people from home and handpicking a team to enter the apart-
ment Mossabah shared with the two suspects; he would have to go with 
those already available. The commander called a sergeant and four police 
officers and told them to meet him at the precinct. 
After the five arrived, Mossabah was again asked to tell his stoty 
from the beginning. They interrupted him with even more questions 
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and requests for clarification and had him draw an extensive diagram of 
his apartment building's exterior and his apartment's interior, highlight-
ing the locations of the backpacks as well as the spaces Mezer and Khalil 
normally ocrupied. The commander took his team into another room and 
devised his tactical plan, giving out assignments as they progressed. The 
team would exerute a standard dynamic search warrant entry. Mossabah 
would lead them to the building. and they would enter using his key. The 
building the team saw upon exiting their vehicle looked nothing like the 
one Mossabah had sketched at the precinct. Thoughts of an ambush ran 
through the officers'minds. Mossabah then led the team through a nar-
row alley, at the end of which the team saw a building resembling the one 
he had drawn. 
The lead officer, protected by a hand-held body bunker, put the key in 
the lock, turned it, and opened the door. The team flooded the apartment, 
yelling. "Police! Get down on the floor!"The first officer through the door 
was met by a man who attempted to physically disarm him. The officer 
fired one shot from his 9-mm pistol, hitting his target. The wounded man 
stumbled backwards, toward a black canvas bag in the comer of the room. 
As he flipped one of four toggles on the front of the bag. another officer 
fired two 5.56-mm rounds into him, and he crumpled into a comer of 
the room. As the team pressed on, a second man in another room lunged 
toward a backpack in a comer. Two shots from an officer's pistol dropped 
him before he could reach it. The entry was over in less than ninety sec-
onds. Both men were taken into rustody. 
The FBI reconstructed both backpack improvised explosive devises, 
determining them to be functional with a blast mdius of more than 100 
yards. Their analysis also revealed that the toggle thrown on the first back-
pack should have detonated the device. It is not known why it failed. 
JOINING THE ELITE 
T his incident highlights the challenges faced by leaders of law enforcement tactical teams: A crisis situation arises suddenly. 
Urgency calls for action. There is no time to handpick a response 
team. The leader must work with whoever is on duty. What can a 
law enforcement leader do to ensure that whoever is working counts among 
the best the agency has? Perhaps through a framework for a selection process 
of tactical teams that ensures transparency, provides a multilayered approach 
for weeding out the unqualified, and has a multitiered means of selecting from 
the strongest of the remaining candidates those capable of performing in dan-
gerous, high-stress operations. 
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The Emergency Service Unit, Special Weapons and Tactics (SWA1), 
Emergency Response Team, and Emergency IncideI\t Team are a few of the 
types of outfits called upon to handle and diffuse the most complex and dan-
gerous situations law enforcement officers encounter. They deal with armed, 
barricaded suspects, hostage situations, shooters, and high-risk search war-
rants. It is sometimes said that when the public needs help, they call the 
police; when the police need help, they call Emergency Service. How does one 
become a member of these elite units? More important, how do leaders select 
applicants for assignment to the agency's special response teams? The pro-
cess is similar to that of any other job: recruitment, an interview (selection), 
and training followed by a probationary period (assessment). The recruitment, 
selection, and assessment "training' procedures of three high-performing and 
high-stakes organizations will be examined here. 
Recruitment 
Although some officers will "walk in" to apply to join a unit, implementing 
a formal recruitment program lends legitimacy as well as transparency to 
the process. It also helps debunk the myth of an" old boy" network, possibly 
preventing future allegations of exclusion, and improve diversity. Two rec-
ommended courses of action are publication of a formal bulletin along with 
briefings or presentations to roll calls department wide. 
Publication and dissemination of a bulletin serves several purposes. 
It reaches the largest pool of potential applicants because it is distributed 
throughout the department. The bulletin should clearly state the minimum 
requirements for assignment as time in service, education, special skills, eval-
uations, and physical requirements if any. Department-wide roll call pre-
sentations, given by members of the unit, validate the inclusiveness of the 
recruitment process and allow prospective applicants the ability to pose ques-
tions to unit members. The application form itself should allow the applicant to 
provide a detailed assignment history covering their entire career. Additional 
information might include education, prior military service, and special skills. 
It should also include a section in which the applicant can explain why he or 
she should be selected and what they would bring to the unit. No application 
should be considered without a signed recommendation and comments from 
the applicant's commanding officer. 
SelectiDn 
The next step in the process is an oral interview. Any commander of a law 
enforcement tactical unit who does not conduct oral interviews for applicants 
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to their team is committing a grave error. There is simply no other way to fully 
appraise an applicant than through a face-to-face meeting. Prior to conduct-
ing interviews, complete packages for all of the applicants must be assembled 
that include at a minimum the completed application, the applicant's previous 
evaluations and personnel file (or a synopsis of the latter), disciplinary records, 
and details of any previous firearms discharges, force complaints, and open 
internal investigations. Applicants with multiple firearms discharges or force 
complaints and open internal investigations must be rigorously evaluated. 
The interview panel should include frontline and ranking or executive-
level supervisors. The ranking officers should not only chair the interview, but 
ask the majority of the questions. This tactic allows the panel to gauge the 
applicant's ability to interact with ranking officers, that is, to operate in a some-
what stressful situation. Being able to function and communicate well under 
stress is a requirement of any member of a law enforcement tactical team. At 
the scene of a major event, the incident commander will usually want to confer 
and coordinate directly with the members of the tactical team. Team members 
must be able to cahnly and coherently respond and not be intimidated by rank. 
Asking applicants about their hobbies, off-duty activities, and volunteer or 
community service offers insight into the person rather than the officer. There 
are two main methods of conducting an interview: asking direct questions or 
asking situational questions. In the direct method, questions will elicit either 
a negative or an affirmative answer. Usually these questions focus on integ-
rity and procedure. The situational method, in which the applicant is presented 
with a situation and asked to indicate how he or she would respond, requires 
more detailed answers. Some situational questions should not and do not have 
a right or wrong answer. The objective is to evaluate the applicant's analyti-
cal skills and gain insight into their decision-making process. For instance, a 
sample situation might probe their response to an active shooter on a crowded 
playground. Another method to evaluate a candidate's analytical ability is to 
provide them with a written, mechanical-reasoning test whose goal is not to 
evaluate their mechanical abilities but rather their analytical ability. 
There are many reasons why a police officer wants to become a mem-
ber of their department's tactical team. Some relish the challenge and want to 
belong to an elite unit. Others have prior militaIy service and enjoy the cama-
raderie of a small unit with a specific mission. One type looking to join the 
team that must be identified during the oral interview is the one enthralled 
by the "glamour factor," whose sole desire is to be near the action and to 
look good in the tactical uniform. These people tend not to be team oriented. 
Posing situational questions where the desired answers are team focused will 
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help identify them. Fortunately, glmy seekers rarely pass the team-related 
parts of the physical tests. 
The use of heavy body annol, additional weapons, and equipment com-
bined, with the often drawn-out time frames of tactical situations require team 
members to be in excellent physical condition. A physical fitness exam can 
help determine a candidate's overall level of fitness and endurance and com-
mitment to a personal fitness program. Some deparbnents use a militaI}'-
style physical fitness test to evaluate applicants'levels of fitness, but collective 
bargaining agreements may preclude an agency from using this method. An 
altemative is a test comprised of job-specific tasks, such as but not limited to 
a timed stair climb while wearing tactical equipment and canying tools, mov-
ing and carrying heavy equipment, and simulated door ramming. The list is 
limited only by the imagination. As long as the task is job specific, it should 
survive a union grievance. During the test, instructors and evaluators should 
ratchet up the mental stress but refrain from hazing candidates. 
A tactical law enforcement officer must be able to function in a high-
stress environment, often for an extended period. The applicant must be able 
to deal with the physical and mental stress while preventing his personal feel-
ings and emotions from interfering with a safe resolution of the incident. Also, 
some incidents will be ended by the application of deadly physical force. The 
interview process and the physical should weed out the majority of unaccept-
able candidates, but no system is perfect; one or two undesirables may give 
all the right answers in an interview and max the physical. Interviewing well 
and being in good shape does not automatically translate into being qualified 
for selection. Instinct, or gut feeling, is one of a police officer's greatest tools. If 
during the selection process a member of the selection committee thinks that 
something just doesn't feel right about an applicant, his or her instinct is prob-
ably right. The applicant should not be selected for assignment. 
Training 
After the interviews and physicals and selection process, the next step is train-
ing. Most large deparbnents have a formal training school, but smaller ones 
may only have a field training, or an on-the-job program, where the newly 
assigned are mentored by a senior team member. Regardless of the size or 
the location, the training program must be structured and fonnalized with 
clearly measurable objectives for each part of the curriculum. The training cur-
riculum should be focused on the unit's mission. Some units may encompass 
all aspects of a tactical situation, ranging from breaching, to hostage negotia-
tion, to rendering explosives safe. Others may focus on breaching and subject 
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apprehension. Regardless of the team's mission, the student's initial training 
curriculum must cover each aspect of its core function. 
Selection for training does not guarantee selection for the unit. Regardless 
of a trainee's rank, the cadre must be in charge. The training program should 
be mentally and physically taxing while devoid of hazing. The tactical team 
and the department's leadership must give the cadre the authority to remove 
any trainee for unsatisfactoxy performance. Prior to the start of training, stu-
dents should be provided with a list of the required standards for perfonnance 
in training. Flagrant safety violations, such as accidental discharges and unsafe 
weapons handling, should be automatic cause for dismissal. Upon completion 
of the training program, the new team member should be assigned to a senior 
team member for assessment. This officer acts as a field training officer and 
mentor for at least six months. A newly assigned team member should not be 
considered fully qualified for at least twelve to eighteen months after comple-
tion of his or her training. 
U.S. ARMY SPECIAL FORCES 
The Thliban move freely throughout Helmand province in Afghanistan. 
They run a well-established web of safe houses that crisscross the desert. 
shuttling resources throughout the area. These Hmt linesH are numerous, 
flexible, and almost invisible, but are the key leads to finding and captur-
ing Taliban leaders and their large caches of equipment and supplies. In 
fall 2009 Captain M and his Special Forces Operational DetachmentAlpha 
(SFODA) team of twelve men sought to disrupt one of these networks and 
question the men involved. They planned and executed a five-day opem-
tion equivalent in size and scope to managing a large multinational corpo-
ration. It involved more than 200 soldiers, civilians, and support personnel. 
Captain M had to request. and coordinate more than ten sepamte support-
ing elements, including two dedicated Blackhawk helicopters, logistical 
support from a U.S. Marine Corps unit, translators, interrogators, demo-
litions, and a force of twelve Afghan soldiers to spearhead the mission. 
Captain M was twenty-seven years old. 
What made this operation different from the myriad of conventional opera-
tions soldiers and marines conduct evexy day in Afghanistan is that Captain 
M and his team conceived and carried out the entire mission on their own. 
This is typical of a SFODA that is expected to function independently, think 
creatively, and use the Hby, with" and throughH method of engagement com-
mon to Special Operations forces (Sap) missions. Such missions include 
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short, violent, and direct engagements using host nation troops to augment 
the SFODA or the SFODA will train and prepare host nation annies to defend 
their countIy against an insurgency. Captain M. had to rehearse the entire 
plan, de-conflict his opemtion with Marine and Spanish general officers, and 
be prepared to take responsibility for billions of dollars worth of assets not to 
mention the lives of the personnel working under him. 
How did Captain M come to join this elite organization? How was he 
able to stand out among his peers to excel during the assessment and selec-
tion phase? A brief historiCal review reveals that elite groups are usually cre-
ated because of a demonstrated need. The Green Berets, a Special Forces unit, 
were bom out of necessity, tracing their roots to the demands of the Office of 
Strategic Services (OSS) in the early 19408. Colone1"Wild Bm"Donovan, the 
founder of OSS, conceived of a force of individuals whose mission would be 
to go behind enemy Jines and train indigenous forces to disrupt and ultimately 
defeat enemy capabilities, all undetected.l Perfonnance of these tasks required 
exceptional individual intelligence, physical agility, special language and tech-
nical skills, and nerves of steel Operators were init4illy selected based on their 
personal connections, leading to the joke that OSS stood for uOh so social" 
As is often the case in the military, mistakes in the field drive innovation. 
Opemtors were often unprepared and overwhelmed by the psychological 
demands of the job, which included m.airttajning a cover, working in isola-
tion, and being under the constant threat of captiviiy.2 It became necessaxy to 
develop better methods of selecting operators for these unconventional mis-
sions. Colonel Donovan eventually elicited the support of prominent psychol-
ogists to help form a nucleus of professionals to advise commanders about 
the best practices for the recruitment, assessment, and selection of men and 
women for the OSS. A thorough account of this program was recorded in The 
Assessment of Men.3 Aspects of it are still used today at the U.S. Army John F. 
Kennedy Special Watfare Center and School (USA]FKSWCS). 
Recruibnent 
How do the Special Forces find what they are looking for? The Arrnr has a 
standardized process involving a permanent group of SF soldiers trained in 
marketing and "selling" SF to find and prepare quality soldiers for SF duty. The 
Special Opemtions Recruiting Battalion's (SORB) sole pw:pose is to educate, 
promote, and advise soldiers and their families about Special Opemtions (SO) 
jobs in the Army. There are several benefits to this dedicated asset. First, the 
recruiters know and have lived as SF opemtors. They are the best possible rep-
resentatives of the organization. Second, the SORB recruiters are constantly 
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communicating with USAjFKSWCS, mamtaining an awareness of changing 
requirements and the needs of the force. Third, marketing efforts, such as the 
Special Operations Parachute Demonstration Team, internet outreach cam-
paigns, promotional videos and documentaries, and a chance to experience SF 
training through virtual reality technology can make being an SF operator the 
job of choice. 
Once an applicant is interested, he is required to sit down with a recruiter 
to discuss basic requirements. H all basic requirements are met, soldiers are 
invited to attend the Special Forces Assessment and Selection (SFAS), located 
at Ft. Bragg, North Carolina. SFAS is a rigorous three-week test of physical 
and mental stamina. The program assesses and selects the best soldiers for 
the organization by measuring individual and group performance in a series 
of stressful events, such as land navigationj extended road marches, and team 
problem-solving tasks. H a candidate's performance is acceptable, he will be 
given the opportunity to enroll in the Special Forces Qualification Course 
(SFQC) where he will learn a specialized skill and a language and complete a 
culmination training exercise ca1led Robin Sage, where all his skills are tested. 
Once a graduate and awarded the coveted Green Beret, he is assigned to a 
Special Forces group and begins to perform his duties and responsibilities on 
an Operational Detachment Alpha (ODA). The entire process can take up to 
twenty-four months, so the recruiter must critically evaluate the commitment 
of the applicant. 
Recruiting for elite organizations like SF can benefit from the support of 
former SF operators and their families. These include retirees and families of 
wounded and fallen comrades. Probably the most effective recruiting tool is 
the loyalty and constancy found among the SF community. It is umnatched in 
the conventional Army. 
Assessment 
What kind of person emerges when he or she is faced with great adversity? 
Teddy Roosevelt said. liThe boy who is going to make a great man must not 
make up his mind merely to overcome a thousand obstacles, but to win in 
spite of a thousand defeats."4 SFAS gives each candidate an opportunity to 
demonstrate an ability to learn, work as part of a team, and maintain motiva-
tion through intense physical and psychological challenges. Each candidate 
is made equal during the assessment phase; rank, experience, and connec-
tions are all disregarded. Many of those who complete the assessment phase 
report that the program was the most difficult test of their lives. This is because 
the psycholOgical stressors of unpredictability, physical discomfort, fatigue, 
and constant evaluation over several weeks are fairly effective at exposing the 
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fortitude of each candidate. It is in this environment that people like Captain 
M slowly rise to the top and stand out among their peers. Research has shown 
that Special Forces soldiexs produce more of a protein-like molecule in the 
blood known as neuropeptide Y. This molecule helps calm the brain in stress-
ful situations.5 
Intelligence, character, and commitment are the three most important 
traits looked £or during the assessment phase. Each candidate is evaluated 
using the Whole Man modeL which is a Gestalt approach following the OSS 
model.6 This means that the assessment phase combines a myriad of tasks 
over time to reduce error and provide the selection committee with the best 
"snapshot" of the candidate. There are many opportunities for the candidate 
to fail and to succeed, and many opportunities for the candidate's traits to 
be observed. 
The tasks used to test candidates are designed to be stressful, but each 
task can be accomplished with some basic physical preparation and grit. For 
example, one well-known candidate exercise is the ~asty Nick" obstacle 
course, aptly named after Colonel NICk Rowe. Rowe, best known for his book 
Five Yean; to Freedom, was an SF officer, POw, and strong advocate for physi-
cally and mentally preparing SF soldiexs £or captivity and to return home with 
honor.7 His stoty is a reminder to SF candidates to show courage and strength 
in the face of adversity. The course is grueling, with more than twenty obstacle 
features. The assessoIS are particularly interested in how the candidates react 
to "perceived failure." Does a candidate bounce back and demonstrate a com-
mitment to improve his peIformance? In addition. a candidate's character may 
be tested £or II cheating" during certain tasks. Will the candidate cheat again if 
given another opportunity? These assessments are designed to relate directly 
to real-world issues commonly confronted by SF soldieIS in combat. These 
kinds of situations require an uncommon resilience or ability to bounce back 
and continue with the mission. SF operators need to be exceptionally stress 
tolerant, as their numbeIS are few, their missions more dangerous than those 
conventional forces may conduct, and their impact on the battlefield greater 
because of their special type of missions. 
Candidates are constantly reminded that they arellalways being assessed," 
but how and when will usually be unknown to them. Events and tests are 
not always what they seem. This fact is even more pronounced during 
team assessment events, which are designed to evaluate how well candi-
dates wod< together to accomplish a task: how well do they plan, communi-
cate their plan. adjust to changing conditions, accomplish the task, and lead 
by example? Candidates are not necessarily judged on whether they finish 
a task; what matters is their approach and how they organize the effort. In 
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addition. candidates are judged on how well they follow the leader. In some 
cases, a leader is not identified.1bis practice was a common assessment tech-
nique used during British officer selection after World War 1.8 Leaderless tasks 
help eva1uatOIS deteImine who in a group has naturalleadeIShip skills. Team 
assessment events also give evaluatoIS insight into peer-to-peer relationships. 
Peer evaluations are another tool used to gauge a candidate's perfor-
mance within a group. Fellow candidates often are more candid and direct 
when it comes to the men they feel they can serve and live with on an ODA. 
Peer evaluations are criticized by some who claim that they are useful only 
for measuring the Npopularity" of an individual. Research suggests, however, 
that peer evaluations are helpful in providing feedback to individuals about 
their perfonnance. Such evaluations also give individuals spedfici concrete 
infonnation on what they can improve about their behavior.' R!er evaluations 
reflect a unique dynamic on an SPODA: the ability to accept and give blunt 
and pmctical feedback. 
The assessment phase ends with the requisite data collected for each can-
didate, and the process of reviewing each candidate begins. The assessors uti-
lize a large database to collect and store data for every class that attends SFAS. 
The database includes more than 27,000 individual records.1bis WIlYt data can 
be reviewed across, between, and within groups. 'IIends are monitored and 
changes to the program can be made based on the available data. 
Selection 
Selection decisions are made based on the needs of the SF community as 
well as the data collected on each candidate. SF leadeIS involved in select-
ing the newest member of the regiment are guided by what are called Special 
Operations Forces 'Ihtths.10 These are inscribed in the halls of the Special 
Warfare Center and School and are helpful reminders of the boundaries that 
limit decisions about hiring the right kind of person for the job. 
Humans are more importtmttJum hRrdware. No matter what technology 
offers, the individual operator and his ability to master and use that technology 
are critical. This means that the ability to solve problems, learn and use a 
language in a foreign country, and build relationships with the indigenous 
population is more important than the newest weapons system, the fastest 
computer program, or the best long-range surveillance optics. With these basic 
mental skills, SF operators can and will excel in any kind of environment The 
organization seeks individuals Dke Captain M who can per£onn when help 
does not arrive on time and can carry on in spite of fafiure. 
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Quality is better than quantity. This statement is under constant scrutiny 
as SF grows exponentially to meet the needs of the force. Soldiers that show 
character and integrity and an ability to resist temptation and to cope with 
perceived negative life events are highlyregarded.At the same time, high energy, 
adventurousness, and risk-takmg behaviors are equally regarded. Individuals 
who push limits are acceptable as long as they demonstrate an awareness of 
boundaries and self-regulation. Captain M learned during the assessment 
phase to seek and accept constant scrutiny by his subordinates, peers, and 
su.perioIs. This habit forces them to always petfonn their best regardless of the 
circumstances and is a hallmark trait of an elite operator. 
Special Operations forces cannot be mass produced. This statement 
reminds the leaders selecting soldiers for this elite organization that individual 
attention, coaching, mentoring, and learning takes time. 'fraining cannot 
be rushed. 
Competent Special Operations foTUs cannot be created after 
emngencies occur. It is crucial that SF operators be ready to petfonn their job 
at anytime. It is equa11ycrucia1 that the SF IpipeIine"continue to feed SFODAs 
with competent men. Fortuna~ SF has a unique system that ensures that 
recruiters, assessors, and commanders are up to date on force needs. SF 
operators are routinely rotated back to the SORB and the Special Warfare 
Center and School as instructors or training company commanders. 
The Special Operations Forces'Iiuths guide selection decisions but there 
are also some checks and balances. The commander balances his judgment 
of candidate perfonnance with the input of other senior SF leaders and sup-
port personnel on a se1ecti.on board consisting of current and former com-
manders, command sergeants major, staff officers, psychologists, and civilians 
with expertise in the SF community. Although the psychologist or other board 
member may have the power to influence, the commander retains the author-
ity to make the final decision regarding the selection of a candidate. Another 
practice is to identify candidates who may not be a good fit for the job of SF 
operator. As stated in one assessment text, "Results of wise decisions can 
range from the mere absence of problems to genuinely excellent outcomes 
promoting organizational purposes[.] ..• [qonsequences of unwise decisions 
can range from inconvenience to disaster,"ll 
Selection errors exist even when rigorous recruitment and assessment 
tools are in place. Individuals who pass the selection gates are usually persons 
with exceptional qualities. Those who enter the Special Forces regiment with-
out these qualities will typically be exposed and removed from further training. 
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THE NORWEGIAN ARMY SPECIAL FORCES 
The special forces team in the MH-47D Chinook helicopter had prepared 
themselves well for the upcoming mission---tIacking down members of 
the Thliban in a remote area of Afghanistan. The low-level flight towaId 
their drop-off point was not an easy ride for the team and their leader. 
The loadmaster gave the first signal, indicating ten minutes to drop-off. 
The team leader turned on his GPS and reviewed the infiltration route one 
more time. The team then made the necessaIY last-minute checks. 
As the loadmaster gave the signal for one minute to drop-off, the pilots 
decreased the speed of the helicopter. The team grabbed their backpacks 
by their handles, preparing to start dragging them towaId the tamp of the 
helicopter. When the Chinook hovered over the drop-off point, the load-
master got down on his knee, turned around,. and commanded,. nGo! Go! 
Go!RJhe team dragged their heavy backpacks towaId the tamp and down 
it. They then threw themselves to the ground amid an inferno of dust and 
small rocks whipped up by the rotor blades. The Chinook lifted off and 
disappeared quickly in the darkness. The team got their weapons up and 
secured the 360 degrees around them. The silence they experienced was 
incredible. The team leader knew that they were on their own now, sur-
rounded by enemies that wanted nothing more than to capture, torture, 
and kill them. The team leader focused on the job they had to do, and the 
team soon started moving. The hunt had begun. 
The Norwegian army special forces, Forsvarets Spesialkommando I HBerens 
Jegerkommando (FSKIHJK), took part during Operation Enduring FreedOlll. 
Task Force K-Bar, and Operation Anaconda in Afghanistan. The size of the 
unit is classified. Operators from FSK/HjK were decorated with the U.S. 
Navy Presidential Unit Citation for their contributions in Afghanistan from 
December 2001 to April 2002.12 These operations, as well as the one described 
above, can place a heavy mental and physical burden on the personnel 
involved, especially those responsible for leading in such situations. Men and 
women who lead units in the world's harshest environments are referred to as 
in extremis leaders.13 
Racrui1mant 
Imagine being the team leader in the chopper before being dropped on the 
ground in Afghanistan. Where would you find people like yourself to follow 
you on such a mission? What kind of person can cope with the type of train-
ing required? ThUning soldiers to handle the extra load and weight has been 
shown to be a decisive factor for success in operations in Afghanistan.l 4. 
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Table 18.1 Physical RequiremenlS for Norwegian Spacial Forces Candidates 
Push-ups 45 
Sit-ups 45 
Pull-ups 8 
Back raise 20 
Step test 140 
Running 32 
Swimming 
Speed march 
Orienteering 
.•. ; 1.- _""_ .>. ~. ,,',.~ 
, e, 
' .... , ";,';.,' I 
Feet together, hands shoulder-width apart 
For 2 minutes 
Chin over the bar for each pull-up 
Repeated at 5-second intervals 
Take 70 steps with each foot carrying a 25 
kilogram backpack 
Complete 32 laps on a 15-by-7-meter short 
track dropping and touching chest to ground 
on one 15-meter side, and on the other 
15-meter side dropping to the ground and 
rolling onto the back 
Swim 400 meters freestyle under 11 
minutes; swim 25 meters underwater; 
dive to a depth of 4 meters 
Complete 30 kilometers, with a 25-kilogram 
backpack and weapon, in under 4 hours and 
45 minutes 
Navigate various lengths of terrain while 
carrying different loads in a backpack 
FSI<IHJK operators come from all classes of SOciety.15 At the age of seven-
teen, they receive a letter from the NOIWegian National Service Administration 
requiring them to appear at a nearby National Service Centre to be tested on 
their suitability for military service. Those who are deterrnm.ed to be qualified 
for military service are called to a military service center close to where they live. 
There they undergo a series of physical and mental tests. Applying for the spe-
cial forces is popular. The minimum requirements for are listed in Table 18.1. 
These requirements should be within reach of most potential candidates, 
but the drop-out rate can be as high as 90 percent once the selection period 
begins. Not many become an SF operator. After basic education as an SF oper-
ator, some members receive further education, up to a master's leveL 16 
Many candidates applying to FSKIH]K have already served as airborne 
rangers for one year during their compulsory military service. Only 4 to 5 per-
cent of new soldiers make it through the selection period to become rangers 
in the first place.17 The airborne rangers who serve the year usually are good 
candidates for SF education. Table 18.2 provides a brief overview of the traits 
and characteristics that FSK!HJK finds desirable in candidates. 
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Table 18.2 Desired Traits and Characteristics of Norwegian Special Forces Candidates 
.. Likes to push their own limits 
.. Knows how to follow rules and regulations 
.. Able to think and operate independently 
.. Willing to obey an order and to commit to the team 
.. Possesses above average control over emotions and a high tolerance for stress 
.. Manages stress and ambiguity well 
.. Has stamina 
.. Able to cope well with people 
.. Has a goal-driven behavior that allows for making detached and realistic judgments 
and exhibits coherent cognition 
FSI<IHjK searches for fast learners who can apply knowledge quickly. It 
also emphasizes general intelligence, and good psychomotor skills in candi-
dates.18 One might easily imagine that while riding in a chopper before being 
dropped in Afghanistan is a demanding exercise. Being able to handle the 
unknown, the unknowable, and the subsequent stress over time is a crucial 
component of the physical and psychological makeup of an SF operator or 
team leader. 
Assessment 
After completing basic education, an operator only needs to make small 
adjustments to shift focus from winter warfare in Norway to operations in 
Afghanistan or other places in the world. However, common knowledge, an 
understanding of other people's culture, occupational proficiency, language 
skills, and the ability to improvise are some of the most important factors that 
contributed to the success of FSI<IHjK operators in Afghanistan. These skills 
have to be developed over years. 
Th.tst, integrity, and flexJ.bility are also important for an SF operator. FSKJ 
HJK operators are taught from the start to work in pairs. They are allowed to 
go to the commander and say that they cannot work with so and so, a type of 
peer evaluation similar to that in the U.S. Special Forces. 'Iiust is also manifest 
in the high degree of openness among team members. After conducting mis-
sions, operators must attend a debriefing and talk to the unit's psychologist.19 
Selection 
Selection is an extensive process, based upon the experiences, practices, and 
knowledge of FSI<IHjK operators, officers, and psychologists over the years. 
The first selection phase lasts three weeks and has many of the same elements 
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as in SFAS to test potential candidates' physical and mental stamina. This 
includes, for instance, long marches with heavy backpacks. Research on para-
trooper aspirants has revealed these individuals to be gifted with above aver-
age intelligence.2Il An SF operator needs to be an individualist and a good 
team player at the same time. Believing that one will succeed can be decisive 
in accomplishing a mission.21 Therefore, belief in one's ability to solve what-
ever problems arise provides an advantage when applying to an SF unit. 
The soldiers in Afghanistan have experienced a significant number of 
knee and back injuries, so testing future FSKIHJK candidates' capacity for 
marching while carrying heavy loads for long stretches would be a good idea.22 
The histoxy of FSKIHJK reveals that the best predictor of which candidates 
will make it through the selection process is the ability to manage physical 
loads over time. In the opening scenario here, all the team members, including 
the leader, had heavy packs that they knew they would have to carxy £or long 
distances over unforgiving terrain. 
As in the British Special Air Service, most of FSKJH]K's selection process 
is done by experienced SF officers.23 Many of them have gut feelings about 
who will make it through the experience. They most likely have been sub-
jected to similar situations as the team and team leader in Afghanistan and 
know what traits and characteristics to look for in a potential candidate. 
CONCWSION 
Members in militaxy special forces and law enforcement emergency service 
units have a lot in common, including working in dangerous and unknowable 
situations, coping with uncertain~ and making quick decisions. Members of 
such units are normally of above average intelligent and have the willpower 
to go the extra mile. Establishing a formal recruitment system is critical, oth-
erwise these units might confront a shortage of candidates applying to them. 
Using experienced officers during selection or mentors during the assessment 
periods is recommended. 
Putting candidates through one or several well-organized interviews will 
reveal important information about a potential candidate. Identifying a can-
didate's motivation for wanting to join a unit is crucial. A strong inner drive 
is necessm:y, but must be combined with the right attitude. Successful can-
didates will show that they have the ability to learn fast and to put acquired 
knowledge into action when needed. 
Several tests should be conducted to detennine whether a candidate can 
withstand the physical and mental stresses of the job. The traits to look for are 
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intelligence, commitment, and good character along with a high tolerance for 
stress. Testing how candidates function under physical stress also reveals per-
sonality traits, willpower, and ability to work with others. An ability to bounce 
back from bad or difficult situations and the level of comfort with ambigu-
ity must be detennined. Honest feedback through peer eva1uatiol\ and can-
didates' response to it, is critical. They must function well on an individual 
and team level, displaying cooperatiOl\ trust, and integrity. It takes time to 
find individuals through the recruitment, assessment, and selection process 
with the physical and mental stamina needed to perform in the type of units 
under discussion. 
KEY TAKE-AWAY POINTS 
1. Elite organizations use dedicated assets to recruit, assess, and select mem-
bers. These duties are separate from training. 
2. Assessment for elite organizations is multidimensional and longitudinal. 
No one task or test is the sole basis for selection or rejection. 
3. Operators in elite organizations accept, seek, and provide constant per-
formance feedback. 
4. Psychologists in elite organizations serve primarily as consultants in the 
assessment and selection processes. Commanders have sole decision-
making authority. 
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